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The Vested Interest Theory: Novel Methodology Examining USForeign Electoral Intervention
Abstract
News of Russia potentially influencing the 2016 US Presidential election shines a light on
the United States' own history of foreign electoral intervention. The United States has a
tumultuous history of foreign electoral intervention starting in 1947 with the founding of
the Central Intelligence Agency. Since then, the US has intervened in as many as eightyone elections around the world. This article provides a novel theory, called the vested
interest theory, that is used to identify the vested interest of the United States, or any
global power, in a foreign electoral intervention. It identifies vested interest by utilizing a
threefold methodology of analysis: the methods and tactics of a predator-country, the stated
justification, and the magnitude of the election in relation to the global power. This article
applies the vested interest theory to four landmark elections in the history of the United
States: the 1948 Italian election, the 1964 Chilean election, the 1970 Chilean election, and
the 2002 Bolivian election. With the application of the vested interest theory, this article
develops a unique perspective of how and why the United States intervenes in foreign
elections.
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ABSTRACT
News of Russia potentially influencing the 2016 US Presidential election
shines a light on the United States’ own history of foreign electoral
intervention. The United States has a tumultuous history of foreign
electoral intervention starting in 1947 with the founding of the Central
Intelligence Agency. Since then, the US has intervened in as many as
eighty-one elections around the world. This article provides a novel
theory, called the vested interest theory, that is used to identify the
vested interest of the United States, or any global power, in a foreign
electoral intervention. It identifies vested interest by utilizing a threefold
methodology of analysis: the methods and tactics of a predator-country,
the stated justification, and the magnitude of the election in relation to
the global power. This article applies the vested interest theory to four
landmark elections in the history of the United States: the 1948 Italian
election, the 1964 Chilean election, the 1970 Chilean election, and the
2002 Bolivian election. With the application of the vested interest theory,
this article develops a unique perspective of how and why the United
States intervenes in foreign elections.

Journal of Strategic Security
© 2018
ISSN: 1944-0464
eISSN: 1944-0472

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2018

1

Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 11, No. 2
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 11, No. 2

INTRODUCTION
Why do global powers, like the United States, get involved in each other’s
elections? Accusations arose during the 2016 US presidential election that
Russia had interfered with the US election after an investigation from the
Intelligence Community. President Obama expelled 35 Russian diplomats
and suspected these intelligence operations in retaliation.1 This incident
has been in the national spotlight giving fuel to both conservative and
liberal rhetoric alike, but the United States is quite familiar with the act of
foreign electoral intervention and political espionage. This article intends
to survey the broad history of the foreign interventions by the United
States and propose a threefold methodology that is used to examine the
how and why global powers, like the United States, seek to influence other
countries’ elections.
The United States has practiced political espionage since before
the signing of the Declaration of Independence in 1776 but electoral
intervention is a more recent phenomenon starting in the mid-20th
century, near the end of World War II. Since the creation of the Office
of Strategic Services in 1942 and the subsequent creation of the Central
Intelligence Agency in 1947, the United States has intervened in as many
as 81 elections around the world.2
Research has shown that about two-thirds of these electoral interventions
were covert, meaning the voters did not know about the intervention
during the election period. About one third of the 81 elections were overt
in nature, meaning the United States publicly supported a candidate
in a foreign election by means of campaign strategy or finance. More
recently, the United States has not been as involved in overt interventions,
ending a streak of elections during the Cold War where the United States
strategically and covertly suppressed the spread of the Communist
Party.3 There is surprisingly little research in foreign electoral intervention
thus this work will greatly utilize the new and landmark research of Dov H.
Levin, Daniel Corstange, Nikolay Marinov, and James Miller.

OVERVIEW OF METHODOLOGY
The methodology will be qualitative and threefold in nature arguing that
the vested interest of the United States within a past foreign election
is determined by analyzing three key variables: the tactics used by the
United States in the intervention, the motivations of the United States to
intervene in a foreign election, and the magnitude of the intervention.
These variables will be analyzed in the context of three landmark electoral
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.672
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interventions by the United States at three different periods of history:
First will be the 1948 Italian election, second will be the 1964 and 1970
Chilean elections, and the third will be the 2002 Bolivian election. These
specific elections were picked are because of their historical significance
and the range of reasons that the United States used to justify becoming
involved in the elections provides insight into how the United States
conducts covert or overt political espionage, helping us arrive to
conclusions on their multivariable incentive. The range of the dates of
occurrence of these elections also provides insight into how the United
States’ decision-making process evolves from the inception of the Central
Intelligence Agency in 1947 to current.
Tactics and methodologies (variable 1; displayed as V1) will answer the
question of how the United States intervened in these elections. They are
outlined as whether they intervened covertly or overtly in the election in
question. The motivations (variable 2; displayed as V2) will answer why
the United States intervened in these elections and their justification.
This variable will utilize Corstange and Marinov’s theory of two types of
foreign intervention: Partisan intervention and process intervention, which
is defined later.4 The application of these categories will set the foundation
of which we will build our new theory. The last component (variable
3; displayed as V3) will answer the significance of the why and how by
analyzing the magnitude of the intervention. The analysis of magnitude
will consist of two categories: How much of a global impact it would
have or had, or if the intervention was solely to further the interests of
Figure 1. The Three-Variable (Vn) Vested Interest Theory.

Notes: V1 will identify the tactics and methodologies of intervention, V2 will
identify the stated motivation of intervention, and V3 will identify magnitude
of intervention then classify it as globally-motivated or self-motivated.
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the United States. This article proposes to label them: Globally-motivated
intervention and self-motivated intervention respectfully.
These three variables are applied to the four pre-selected elections and
given a value-based metric of high vested interest or low vested interest.
Delimitations
This article seeks to apply the threefold methodology to the four
previously stated elections that the United States interfered. These
electoral interventions do not include any coup d’états or forced regime
changes that have happened in the past. It only seeks to analyze strategic
intervention where the United States utilizes covert or overt methods to
influence rather than to coerce.
Definition of Terms
•

Espionage is known colloquially as spying but in this context,
espionage is defined as the art or practice of spy-craft, or using
spy tactics to collect, analyze, or influence intelligence.

•

Covert Action in the context of this article will retain its original
definition from the Central Intelligence Agency as a foreign
policy tool to further US interests in another country without
the US Government being fully aware of it.

•

Overt Action is a type of action used by the United States
government that is public in nature, “operations… without
concealment.”

•

Partisan Intervention as proposed by Corstange and Marinov is
“where the foreign power takes a public stance on its support
for one side [of an election].”5

•

Process Intervention as proposed by Corstange and Marinov, is
“to support the rules of democratic contestation, irrespective
of who wins.” Essentially intervening in the election to maintain
the democratic process.6

•

Foreign Electoral Intervention is the action of one country,
covertly or overtly, intervening in another country’s election or
its subsequent results.

•

Globally-motivated intervention is a country intervenes in the
election of another country for the interests, betterment, or
well-being of the international audience.

•

Self-motivated intervention is a country intervenes in the
election of another country to further the interests, betterment,
or well-being of themselves.

https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.672

https://digitalcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol11/iss2/2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.1672

4

Godinez: The Vested Interest Theory
The Vested Interest Theory

•

Predator-country is a colloquial term this article proposes to
define the aggressor country that intervenes into the other
country’s election.

•

Prey-country is a colloquial term this article proposes to
define the receiving country that is having their election
intervened.

LITERATURE REVIEW AND HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND
ITALY, 1948 GENERAL ELECTION
Background
The 1948 Italian general election was held on April 18, 1948 to elect the
First Republican Parliament of the country. Earlier that year in February,
there was a communist coup d’état in Czechoslovakia where the
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ), backed by the Soviet Union,
forced the resignation of non-Communist cabinet and parliament ministers
and appointed a new government that was friendly to the KSČ. The coup
brought Czechoslovakia into the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. This
worried the United States and brought speculation that it could influence
the Italian election and bring Italy into the Soviet sphere of influence.
There was such strong speculation that Italy would be drawn into the
Soviet sphere of influence that Time Magazine released a statement
saying that a probable left-wing victory in the Italian election will be “the
brink of catastrophe.”7
The campaign was a three-way race between Alcide De Gasperi of
the Christian Democracy party (DC), Palmiro Togliatti of the Popular
Democratic Front (FDP), and Ivan Matteo of the Socialist Unity party
(SU). The Popular Democratic Front was a leftist coalition of parties that
consisted of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) and the Italian Socialist
Party (PSI). Italian historians quote the campaign as being, “the most
passionate, the most important, the longest, the dirtiest, and the most
uncertain electoral campaign in Italian history.”8
Near the end of the campaign period, only two parties were left: The DC
and the FDP. Both the DC and FDP were competing for their own vision
of the future of Italy. The Christian Democracy was the right-wing and
conservative party that fought for a capitalist Italy, citing that within
communist countries, “children send parents to jail...children are owned
by the state…[and] people eat their own children.”9 The DC also utilized
religious propaganda slogans to influence voters.10
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The FDP led the de facto Italian Communist Party that had trouble
controlling militant arms of the party that terrorized parts of Italy within
an area deemed the Red Triangle.11 The PCI pushed the Italian Socialist
Party out of prominence and effectively sat on the sidelines with the
Socialist Unity party. The Cold War effectively started the year before
the election in 1947. This geopolitical tension prompted President Harry
Truman to sign the National Security Act of 1947 that legalized foreign
covert operations. The National Security Act was a major restructuring of
military and intelligence agencies of the United States. The Act created
the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States Air Force, protected
the United States Marine Corps as their own branch, and abolished the
Department of War. It also set the framework for the United States’
involvement in future foreign elections.12
Methodology of Intervention by the United States
The 1948 election was first influenced by the tension ramping up between
the Soviet Union and the United States. The political climate between the
two Superpowers was spreading throughout the world and an election
victory could mean the difference of one side of the War or another.
The tactics of intervention used by the United States were covert and
classified in nature. The budget of the project has maintained classified
status, but the details have since been released to the public.
First, the United States used financial means to help the DC. F. Mark
Wyatt, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Officer stated, “We had bags of
money that we delivered to selected politicians, to defray their political
expenses, their campaign expenses, for posters, [and] for pamphlets.”
This covert financial backing of the DC set the foundation of a much
larger operation. Second, the United States created an influence campaign
reminiscent of the recent Russian influence campaign.13 Multiple US
agencies coordinated in writing millions of letters that were distributed
to voters, making anti-communist short-wave radio broadcasts, and
publishing hundreds of books and articles all of which were used to
convince the Italian voter population to believe that consequences were
imminent in a Communist-run Italy. Third, the US media backed the
operation and made a public endorsement of the leader of the Christian
Democracy, Alcide De Gasperi. Time Magazine featured Gasperi on the
cover of the April 1948 edition and covered him in their leading story.14
The Soviet Union was running a similar operation backing the PCI without
evidence to prove an influence campaign of similar caliber.15 Wyatt
estimates that as the campaign neared the election, the amounts of
Soviet money grew to “$8-$10 million a month...directly out of the Soviet
compound in Rome”16 The Kremlin has actually released a statement
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.672
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disputing the amount of money going into PCI, instead stating that the
amount of money was “occasional and modest.”17
The US intervention methodologies prevailed, and the Christian
Democracy won a decisive victory over PCI by winning 48.11 percent of
the vote, which amounted to 305 seats in the Italian Chamber of Deputies
and 131 seats in the Italian Senate.18 The CIA continued this practice for 24
years after the initial election in 1948, and according to Wyatt, a left-wing
group would not win an election until 1996- 48 years later.19

CHILE, 1964 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Background
The United States has a long history of meddling in the country of Chile
starting as early as 1809 when President James Madison sent an inspector
to investigate revolutionaries within the Spanish colonies in South
America.20 United States interests in Chile slowly ramped up throughout
the first half of the twentieth century as two major US companies,
Kennecott and Anaconda, grabbed hold of most of Chilean resources.
For the majority of the twentieth century Kennecott and Anaconda
“controlled between 7 percent to 20 percent of the country’s Gross
Domestic Product (GDP).”21
The 1964 Chilean election maintains a similar theme as the 1948 Italian
election in that US interests were fueled by fears that the country would
succumb to a political party that we surrender them to the Soviet
Union. The Chilean election was a three-way race between Eduardo Frei
Montalva who was representing the Christian Democratic Party (PDC),
Salvador Allende of the Socialist party (PS), and Julio Duran of the
Radical party (PR).
This was Allende’s second time running for president after losing by
about 33,000 votes to President Jorge Alessandri in the 1958 election.
President Alessandri was an ally to the United States during his
presidency, even introducing tariffs that flooded the Chilean markets
with American products.22 Salvador Allende made a comeback in the
1964 election and was a top contender for the presidency until the United
States found his policies not in line with US interests. Allende’s stated
intent was “to bring about an “‘irreversible’” Marxist revolution in Chile.”
Allende was not only supported by the PS, but by a group of leftist
parties that came together to support him who went by the name of the
Popular Action Front (FRAP).23
Methodology of Intervention by the United States
The thematic fear of Cold War sympathy, as seen in the 1948 Italian
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election, remains constant throughout this election as well. The United
States authorized money to support the PDC in 1962 and after the
intervention strategy was finalized, the CIA approved $3 million for
execution of their plans.24 The funds for the election were not only
delivered to candidates covertly but were also funneled to the country
using President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress partnership
to create better diplomatic relations with Latin America. Using the
$20 million in the Alliance for Progress partnership, the United States
sent about 100 staff members to support the intervention program.25
The intervention tactics were covert in nature and mostly utilized a
large-scale propaganda campaign to skew public opinion of the leftist
candidate, Allende.
Tactics like covert radio and print advertising were primary methods
of influence and intervention. Later in the campaign, they also utilized
conventional campaigning techniques like polling voters to supporters
and non-supporters, GOTV (get out the vote) drives that are aimed
to mobilize a targeted voter base to support a candidate, and voter
registration drives used to register non-voters and irregular voters to
get out and vote. Frei Montalva had an impressive victory, winning 56.61
percent of the vote. Allende’s campaign was able to conjure 38.9 percent
of the vote and Julio Duran earned 5 percent. The program was not only
managed the Central Intelligence Agency but also was a joint effort with
the US Department of State.26

CHILE, 1970 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
Background
The United States’ plan for intervention in the 1970 Chilean election
built on the large-scale program established in 1964. The election was a
three-way race between Salvador Allende of the Socialist party, Jorge
Alessandri who was independent, and Radomiro Tomic of the Christian
Democratic Party. The committee overseeing covert operations decided
that the United States will not be supporting either candidate against
Salvador Allende, the leftist candidate, but instead focused its efforts
against the Popular Unity (UP) coalition that supported Allende. The UP
was a group of leftist parties comprised of Socialist, Communist, and other
leftist ideologies that came together in a united front. The UP was directly
funded by the KGB (Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti; Soviet
intelligence agency) from a personal request from Allende to the Soviet
Union to provide funding at the amount of “$400,000...and an additional
personal subsidy of $50,000 directly to Allende.” 27 He requested this
from his own personal contact, KGB officer Svyatoslav Kuznetsov and this
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.672
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assistance was a known turning point in the outcome of the election.28
The campaign period was marked with violent acts caused by the
Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a guerilla movement that was
founded in student organizations across the universities in Chile. The
leaders of the MIR were active in the youth branch of the Socialist Party
where they developed endorsements and alliances with trade unions and
local electorates throughout the country. One of the notable early leaders
was Andrés Pascal Allende who was a nephew of Salvador Allende.29
Methodology of Intervention by the United States
The United States’ methodology was notably different compared to
the 1964 election. They focused primarily on a covert “anti-Allende
propaganda” versus supporting any one candidate in the three-way race.
The United States spent $425,000 to produce this propaganda, labeling
it a “scare campaign,” of which included pamphlets, posters, and other
campaign literature that linked a government or regime led by Allende
to be connected to the oppression and failures of the Soviet Union.30 The
United States also connected with local media and groomed journalists
to produce anti-Allende articles, particularly through El Mercurio, a
prominent Chilean newspaper.31
The main goal behind the campaign was to target the distressed economy
of Chile and add financial and social panic that the country was on
the brink of a financial disaster. While the economy was stressed, they
released the anti-Allende propaganda that the United States hoped would
connect Allende and his leftist ideology with the failing economy. They
also aimed to break apart the UP by splitting the Radical Party off from
the coalition.32
As mentioned in the background, the KGB was funding Allende’s campaign
and the UP coalition directly. These directed funds were utilized more
efficiently than the US campaign, which contributed to Allende winning
much of the vote. The then-CIA Director Richard Helms stated that the
White House wanted him to “beat something with nothing,” blaming them
for the inefficient funds to run a complete intervention campaign.33
Allende won the election with many of the votes at 36.61 percent,
Alessandri received 35.27 percent of the votes, and Tomic received 28.11
percent. No candidate won an absolute majority of the votes (greater
than 50 percent of the popular vote) so the decision went to the Chilean
National Congress to decide between the top two candidates, Allende
and Alessandri, to decide the next President of Chile.34 During the time
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between the election and the Presidential Inauguration, the National
Congress seemed to favor Alessandri as a candidate over Allende. The
United States exploited this by intensifying their propaganda operations
and having actions approved by the US Ambassador to Chile. The political
climate of Chile intensified enough to result in a military coup d’état
supported by the United States in 1973.35

BOLIVIA, 2002 GENERAL ELECTION
Background
Like Chile and other South American countries, Bolivia has a long history
of political instability since The Bolivian War of Independence in 1809. The
2002 Bolivian election marked the fifth consecutive democratic election
after the country developed a multi-party democracy after multiple coups
d’état in the early 1980s.36 As the Bolivians developed a consistent political
party system, three major parties emerged. The Revolutionary Nationalist
Movement (MNR) and the Nationalist Democratic Action (ADN)
emerged from the center right. The Revolutionary Left Movement (MIR)
represented the center left. Various parties were founded to compete with
the three major parties and were successful enough to capture a small
amount of the votes.
Two years before the election in 2000, the country was in turmoil over
privatization of water infrastructure in Cochabamba, the third-largest
city of Bolivia, by the company Semapa. This turmoil resulted in a full
year of protests where thousands of people marched against national
police resulting in hundreds of injuries. This protest was known as the
Cochabamba Water War. During the time that the Cochabamba Water
War was ramping up, the Bolivian government was trying to eradicate
cocoa farms as part of a program to enforce the United States’ War on
Drugs. The cocoa farmers, known as cocaleros, were forced to mobilize,
create unions, and create a political party known as the Movement for
Socialism- Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the Peoples (MASIPSP, or MAS).37
The election was a six-way race with the three major parties and smaller
populist parties. The top three contenders were Gonzalo Sanchez de
Lozada who was the candidate with the Revolutionary Nationalist
Movement and the Free Bolivia Movement (MNR-MBL), Evo Morales
who was the candidate with the Movement for Socialism (MAS, AKA
MAS-IPSP), and Manfred Reyes Villa who was the candidate for the New
Republic Force (NFR). Sanchez de Lozada won the election with 22.5
percent of the vote and Evo Morales won with 20.9 percent of the vote.
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.672
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The Bolivian government has an absolute majority political system where
if no candidate wins an absolute majority (greater than 50 percent of the
vote) then the Legislature will pick between the top two candidates.38
What helped Sanchez de Lozada the most was his enlistment of American
political strategist James Carville and the firm Greenberg Carville Shrum.
Carville was Chief Strategist on Bill Clinton’s presidential campaign
that led him to the White House. Sanchez de Lozada was not liked in
Bolivia because of his United States ties and American accent. He grew up,
attended schools in the United States, and was viewed as a foreigner. James
Carville was able to turn notoriously low chances into a winning campaign.39
Methodology of Intervention by the United States
The tactics used by the United States to interfere in the Bolivian election
was overt in nature, a change compared to the Chilean and Italian
elections that utilized covert espionage tactics. The Bolivian populace
was revolting against globalist policies enacted by Sanchez de Lozada
in his previous term as president that were sympathetic to US interests
in Bolivia. As mentioned in the background, the United States wanted to
eradicate cocoa farms to enforce the War on Drugs in South America.
Evo Morales, the MAS candidate and president of the cocalero union,
fought to maintain these farms. For the United States to maintain their
interests in the country, the then-US Ambassador to Bolivia, Manuel
Rocha, made a statement saying that the United States will cut off aid to
Bolivia because of its support of cocoa farms.40 This resulted in a huge
surge of support for Evo Morales effectively leading him to finish close
second at the election.41

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
The research design of this theory is primarily qualitative in nature
with supplementary quantitative datasets of espionage expenditure.
The information used to conduct this research is a range of academic
documents published by a few key researchers in foreign electoral
intervention. As foreign electoral intervention is a small, yet budding,
field in political science, the following scholars dominate the research:
Dov H. Levin, Daniel Corstange, Nikolay Marinov, and James Miller. These
researchers have created original theories and electoral datasets that this
thesis will build off, laying the foundation for future researchers in this field.
Besides academic publications, this thesis has utilized news media from
the period of time that the elections occurred. As evident in a few of
the elections, the United States conducted influence and information
campaigns where US media, and foreign media alike, endorse and inform
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voters to vote for a certain candidate. These articles provide insight into
the methodology used by the United States. Congressionally chartered
investigative reports are used to analyze unclassified insights into the
rationale behind some of the interventions. The Central Intelligence
Agency meticulously documented their involvement in some of the
elections so when an investigative inquiry was launched they could share
their own research and methodologies, though partially redacted, with
Congress and the public.
The methodology of the vested interest theory as applied to the elections
is as follows:
1948 Italian Election
V1: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when
they intervene in a foreign election?
When analyzing the tactics and methodologies used by the United States
it will first be determined if the intervention utilized covert or overt
action. The information that we will use to determine this comes primarily
from first-hand accounts of CIA Intelligence Officer F. Mark Wyatt who
reported the extent of the United States involvement in Italy to Cable
News Network (CNN). Secondly, what needs to be determined is if the
United States is expending resources to combat an opposition force,
for example an opposing political candidate or an opposition campaign.
Another component to this second variable is if they are opposing overtly
or covertly against their adversaries. Third, what needs to be analyzed
is the United States’ financial expenditure on the intervention tactics.
This information is less readily available depending on the election since
mission budgets tend to stay classified, though we can maintain rough
estimates based on how extensive the intervention is. For the Italian
election specifically, F. Mark Wyatt has mentioned many financial figures in
terms of United States intervention in his extensive interviews with CNN.42
V2: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a
foreign election?
The United States will generally form a justification for why they are to
get involved in an election. For the 1948 Italian election specifically, the
stated motivation will be derived from F. Mark Wyatt’s statements on why
the intervention happened. James Miller’s research on Cold War elections
will also be used to supplement the analysis of Wyatt’s statements.
The second variable of this question will answer if the intervention is a
process intervention or partisan intervention. Determining whether the
intervention is for process or partisan is important because it sheds light
into whether the United States intervened to support a specific political
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.672
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party or solely to support the democratic and political process. F. Mark
Wyatt’s statements on the election will again be used to identify political
or partisan intervention.
V3: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?
Analyzing the magnitude of the intervention consists of two variables:
First is analyzing if the purpose of the intervention was for global
betterment and betterment for the prey-country and the surrounding
region or if the intervention was solely to further the interests of the
United States. These two variables will be labeled globally motivated
intervention and self-motivated respectively. After determining whether
the intervention was globally or self-motivated, we can then analyze how
much of a qualitative impact the intervention had on both the predator
and prey-country.
1964 Chilean Election & 1970 Chilean Election43
V1: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when
they intervene in a foreign election?
To identify the tactics and methodologies of United States intervention
in Chile, the Congressionally-chartered Church Committee report will be
used to determine the three variables of the first sub-question: Covert or
overt action, whether they are combating an opposition, and the financial
expenditure of the United States. Various academic articles will add
accessory information to supplement the Church report.
V2: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a
foreign election?
Since there was a Congressional inquiry into these elections specifically,
the stated justification was published in the Church report. The accuracy
or sincerity of the justification is something that can be explored later.
Whether the election was process or partisan motivated will again be
determined by the Church report and supplemented by various academic
articles.
V3: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?
The Church report and a few academic sources will again be used to
determine if the intervention was globally or self-motivated. Andrew and
Mitrokhin’s text on the KGB involvement in third-world countries will be
used to determine the global or domestic impact of the intervention.
2002 Bolivian Election
V1: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when
they intervene in a foreign election?
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The Bolivian election is different from the other elections in that covert
action was not taken in the country to influence this specific country, so
all political espionage happens with overt action and public policy. The
primary sources that will be used to examine this election are academic
articles that examine US foreign policy in South America, some that detail
terrorist or guerrilla tactics, and others that discuss the general political
instability of the country that led to the United States trying to intervene
in the election. Because the intervention tactics in this election are overt
in nature, the financial expenditure and the opposition campaign will be
easier to assess.
V2: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a
foreign election?
The stated motivation of this intervention was based on US foreign
policy at the time, so the research that will be used includes academic
examinations of early-2002 US foreign policy. The second component of
this question, partisan or process intervention, applies to this election in
a different sense compared to the other elections. Because of the overt
nature of the intervention, the partisan motivation of the United States is
well documented, so the same sources will be used to examine this.
V3: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?
Identifying whether this intervention was globally or self-motivated will
be derived from the same major academic sources as before and from
those sources, we can determine the domestic or global impact that the
intervention had.

RESULTS OF THE STUDY
The research and data that will be used to determine the vested interest
of the United States has been gathered in this section. In the following
section, the research and data will be examined in the context of the
vested interest theory and a conclusion will be derived to find the vested
interest of the United States in the four elections that have been selected.
1948 Italian Election
V1: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when
they intervene in a foreign election?
The sources used to determine the methodologies of the United States in
the 1948 Italian election were statements made by F. Mark Wyatt. Wyatt
was a former CIA Intelligence Officer who joined the CIA Clandestine
Service in 1948. When commenting on tactics used in the Italian election
he stated:
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.672
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“The communist party of Italy was funded, in the first place, by
black bags of money directly out of the Soviet compound in
Rome; and the Italian services were aware of this. As the elections
approached, the amounts grew, and the estimates [are] that $8
million to $10 million a month actually went into the coffers of
communism…we had bags of money that we delivered to select
politicians, to defray their political expenses, their campaign
expenses, for posters, for pamphlets.”44
Wyatt’s comments could be used to answer all three clarifying questions
under the first major sub-question.
V2: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a
foreign election?
The stated motivation of the intervention in the 1948 Italian election can
be traced back to F. Mark Wyatt’s statements in an interview with CNN.
He said,
“I was deeply concerned, and I was glad to see things like [George]
Kennan...saying that, ‘This election is coming up, and should the
communists be able to form a government, should they win, our
whole position in the Mediterranean and probably in Europe will be
undermined.’ And I was delighted to see that attention was paid on
it.”45
Later, he addressed the spread of the Soviet Union in Italy, he said,
“what the CIA needed was authority to develop a program of covert
action which could confront and meet the everlasting and indefinite
expansionism of the Soviet Union.”46
V3: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?
When identifying the magnitude of an electoral intervention, based on
the theory, it must be determined if the intervention was globally or
self-motivated in nature. In F. Mark Wyatt’s previous statement, that
determines the stated motivation:
“I was deeply concerned, and I was glad to see things like [George]
Kennan...saying that, ‘This election is coming up, and should the
communists be able to form a government, should they win, our
whole position in the Mediterranean and probably in Europe will be
undermined.’ And I was delighted to see that attention was paid on
it.”47
He states that a “coming up” of the communists will lead to the United
States losing their position in the Mediterranean. Using this statement, we
will explore whether this means that the US intervention was globally or
self-motivated.
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1964 Chilean Election & 1970 Chilean Election
V1: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when
they intervene in a foreign election?
The main source used for the 1964 and 1970 Chilean elections is the
Church Committee report on covert action in Chile from 1963 to 1973.
Here is an excerpt from the Church Committee report with respect to
propaganda operations:

“The most extensive covert action activity in Chile was
propaganda. It was relatively cheap. In Chile, it continued at a low
level during “normal” times, then was cranked up to meet particular
threats or to counter particular dangers… The most common form
of a propaganda project is simply the development of “assets” in
media organizations who can place articles or. be asked to write
them… the covert propaganda efforts in Chile also included “black”
propaganda-material falsely purporting to be the product of a
particular individual or group. In the 1970 election, for instance,
the CIA used “black” propaganda to sow discord between the
Communists and the Socialists and between the national labor
confederation and the Chilean Communist Party.”48
Figure 2. Tactics and methodology expenses expanded on 1964 Chilean
election.49

TECHNIQUE

AMOUNT

Propaganda for elections and other support for political parties

$8,000,000

Producing and disseminating propaganda and supporting mass media

$4,300,000

Influencing Chilean institutions (labor, students, peasants, women)

$900,000

Promoting military coup d’état

<$200,000

Notes: Figures rounded to the nearest 100,000.

Besides discussing propaganda, the Church Committee report also
discusses other techniques of intervention such as supporting local media;
gaining influence in Chilean institutions; supporting political parties; and
direct efforts to promote a military coup. The report also provides a
breakdown of expenditure of propaganda operations: 49
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V2: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a
foreign election?
The United States’ stated motivation for intervention is detailed in the
Church Committee report as follows:
“The goal, broadly, was to prevent or minimize the influence of
Chilean Communists or Marxists in the government that would
emerge from the 1964 election. Consequently, the U.S. sought the
most effective way of opposing FRAP (Popular Action Front), an
alliance -of Chilean Socialists, Communists, and several miniscule
non-Marxist parties of the left which backed the candidacy of
Salvador Allende. Specifically, the policy called for support of the
Christian Democratic Party, the Democratic Front (a coalition of
rightist parties), and a variety of anti-communist propaganda and
organizing activities.”50
The United States also played a role in the 1970 Chilean election but at a
much smaller scale compared to the 1964 election. The Church Committee
states, “that effort, however, was smaller and did not include support
for any specific candidate. It was directed more at preventing Allende’s
election than at insuring another candidate’s victory.”
V3: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?
The Church Committee report will be used to determine the magnitude
of the 1964 and 1970 Chilean election. In the stated justification, we found
that the report stated the following on the 1964 Chilean election:
“The goal, broadly, was to prevent or minimize the influence of
Chilean Communists or Marxists in the government that would
emerge from the 1964 election. Consequently, the U.S. sought the
most effective way of opposing FRAP (Popular Action Front), an
alliance -of Chilean Socialists, Communists, and several miniscule
non-Marxist parties of the left which backed the candidacy of
Salvador Allende. Specifically, the policy called for support of the
Christian Democratic Party, the Democratic Front (a coalition of
rightist parties), and a variety of anti-communist propaganda and
organizing activities.”51
From this excerpt, we can also determine the magnitude of the
intervention and if it was globally or self-motivated. Further, in the report
it states:
“The U.S. reaction to Fidel Castro’s rise to power suggested that
while the Monroe Doctrine had been abandoned, the principles
which prompted it were still alive. Castro’s presence spurred a new
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United States hemispheric policy with special significance for Chilethe Alliance for Progress. There was little disagreement among
policy-makers either at the end of the Eisenhower Administration
or at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration that something
had to be done about the alarming threat that Castro was seen to
represent to the stability of the hemisphere.”52
In this excerpt, the Committee took note of Fidel Castro’s rise to power and
subsequent threat to the stability of the region as a motivation for electoral
intervention and political espionage over the course of two elections.
2002 Bolivian Election
V1: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when
they intervene in a foreign election?
Due to the public nature of the 2002 Bolivian electoral intervention, we
will be using media coverage and academic writings from the time. A New
York Times article from 2002 details:
“Mr. Morales’s showing is a blow to the United States, which has
financed a largely successful effort to eradicate most of Bolivia’s
coca, which is used to produce cocaine… Mr. Morales, a harsh critic
of the United States, has charged that the American ambassador in
La Paz, Manuel Rocha, has been pressuring leading lawmakers on
behalf of Mr. Sanchez de Lozada.”53
More recently, Jorge Dominguez wrote an editorial piece in the North
American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) detailing the United
States’ tumultuous history of electoral intervention in South American
countries. Here is what he says about the 2002 Bolivian electoral
intervention:
“More recently, the intervention of U.S. Ambassador Manuel Rocha,
under instructions from Washington, against Evo Morales in the
2002 Bolivian presidential election exemplifies the same dramatic
failure. In response to the Ambassador’s warning that Bolivians
should vote against Morales because of his leadership of the coca
growers’ movement, Morales’ support soared, and he came in a
close second on election day.”54
Since this action was overt in nature and the intervention itself was so
miniscule, there is no need to examine the expenses.
V2: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a
foreign election?
The stated motivation of the United States’ intervention in the 2002 Bolivian
election was the eradication of cocoa farms as part of the War on Drugs
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.672
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under the Bush Administration. Like earlier stated, the US Ambassador,
under orders from the White House, made a statement saying, “voting for
Mr. Morales could jeopardize American assistance and investment.”55
Something of note in the Bolivian election is that the United States
had unconscious influence on the election by use of private political
consultants. James Carville, Stan Greenberg, and Robert Shrum were
leading political consultants who were tasked to breathe life into the
dying campaign of Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada.56
V3: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?
Again, using the stated motivation from the second sub-question we
will derive the magnitude of the 2002 Bolivian election and determine
whether it is globally or self-motivated. The determination whether the
intervention was globally or self-motivated. The stated justification comes
from an article in the Argentinian newspaper Clarín, “I want to remind the
Bolivian electorate that if you choose those who want Bolivia to become a
cocaine exporter, it will endanger US aid.”57
During the time of the 2002 Bolivian election, the US President George
W. Bush and his administration were proactively implementing the War
on Drugs he inherited from his father, President George H. W. Bush, and
President Ronald Reagan. This led to orders from the White House to tell
US Ambassador Manuel Rocha to address the Bolivian electorate.58

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
Summary of Results
The results from the study will be summarized here following the
previous formats of Election→Vn. The previous background research from
Literature Review will be used to answer these questions and determine
the vested interest. These answers will be derived in the discussion below.
1948 Italian Election
V1: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when
they intervene in a foreign election?
The research into the 1948 Italian election was able to identify statements
from F. Mark Wyatt, a CIA Intelligence Officer from the era that served
as the Rome Station Chief in Italy. Wyatt identified clandestine tactics:
Political posters, brochures, and propaganda, expenses, and a largescale influence campaign all used by the United States to combat Soviet
influence of the same kind. Wyatt stated that money was coming directly
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out of the Russian Embassy in Italy to fund the leftist coalition in the
election.59
V2: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a
foreign election?
The stated motivation of the United States in the 1948 Italian election was
stated directly from F. Mark Wyatt. Wyatt stated that the United States
needed to develop covert action programs to address the expansion of
the Soviet Union. Cold War fears are thematic in every election that this
thesis examines, motivations stem from fear of leftist candidates winning.
V3: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?
Determining the magnitude of the 1948 Italian election first started with
identifying whether the election was self-motivated or globally motivated.
This identification will be saved for the discussion, but the research used
was able to identify a statement from F. Mark Wyatt that stated that the
Mediterranean would be undermined if the Soviet Union were to expand
through Italy and potentially through Europe.60
1964 & 1970 Chilean Election
V1: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when
they intervene in a foreign election?
Tactics used in the 1964 and the 1970 elections were similar and were
discussed jointly in the Church Committee report but for this portion of the
summary of results the elections will be separated. The Central Intelligence
Agency initially approved $3 million for executing covert action, but
$20 million was also funneled to the country through John F. Kennedy’s
Alliance for Progress program that was used to develop better diplomatic
relations with Latin American countries. Besides covert radio and print
advertising, conventional political techniques were used to influence the
election: Using pollsters and polling data, GOTV operations, and voter
drives were all used by the United States to influence the 1964 election.61
The tactics used in the 1970 Chilean election were substantially different
compared to the 1964 election. The United States tried to develop an
“anti-Allende” campaign rather than supporting any one candidate like in
the 1964 election. The tactics used were primarily pamphlets, posters, and
other propaganda that tried to connect the failing Chilean economy with
the failures of the Soviet Union in the minds of the Chileans. The United
States also tried to connect with local media, producing articles that
were anti-Allende. The United States spent $425,000 for this intervention
(compared to $3 million in the previous intervention) and development of
the propaganda.62
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V2: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a
foreign election?
The stated motivation in both the 1964 and 1970 elections were also
identified in the Church Committee report. The report states that the
goal of electoral intervention is to “prevent or minimize” influence
coming from the Chilean Communists and Marxists. The Communists
and Marxists were partnered under a leftist coalition that shared an anticapitalist US ideology.63
V3: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?
Identifying whether the 1964 and 1970 Chilean elections are self
or globally motivated will come from analyzing the statements of
justification said in the Church Committee report that the reason that the
United States intervened in Chilean affairs was to “minimize the influence
of Chilean Communists” in 1964. In the 1970 election, the United States did
not create an effective plan of attack against the leftist coalition nor did
they fully support or fund their own candidate; instead, the United States
ran an “anti-Allende” campaign that was doomed to fail.64
2002 Bolivian Election
V1: What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United States when
they intervene in a foreign election?
The United States used more indirect and overt tactics to intervene
in the 2002 Bolivian election compared to the other elections. The US
Ambassador to Bolivia, Manuel Rocha, made a strong statement to the
Bolivian electorate that voting for Evo Morales, the Socialist candidate
and cocalero union leader would destroy relations with the United States
and that Bolivia will lose aid because of their support of cocoa farms. This
statement did influence the election but a different effect than anticipated.
V2: What is the stated motivation for the United States to intervene in a
foreign election?
The stated motivation of the United States in the 2002 Bolivian election
was a public stance against the Bolivian’s support for cocoa farms and the
union farmers who worked on them. The Bush Administration inherited
the War on Drugs from his father, President George H. W. Bush, and
President Ronald Reagan.
V3: What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?
Identifying the magnitude of the 2002 Bolivian election comes from the
statement made by US Ambassador to Bolivia Manuel Rocha. According
to the Argentine newspaper Clarin he said, “I want to remind the Bolivian
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electorate that if you choose those who want Bolivia to become a cocaine
exporter, it will endanger US aid.”65 This statement came from direct
orders from the White House, who wanted to maintain the War on Drugs
and keep Bolivian cocaine out of the United States.66

DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
This section will take the vested interest theory and apply it to the
research conducted in previous section. The previous section research
and the Summary of Results section will serve as the academic backing
that this article will draw from to form any conclusions. The vested
interest theory methodology will be summarized per each election and
conclusions will be drawn from there.67
1948 Italian Election
The 1948 Italian election was held to elect the first republican parliament
of the country. A coup d’état in Czechoslovakia was held earlier in the year
backed by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. This worried the United
States as this coup d’état and propping of a Soviet-backed government
would bring Italy into the Soviet sphere of influence. The United States
saw that the Soviet Union was conducting covert political operations in
Italy as the election ramped up. The United States made an endorsement
of De Gasperi, the Christian Democracy candidate, and US intervention
methodologies led to a victory over the Soviet-backed faction.68
Following the vested interest theory, the tactics and methodologies will
be organized by whether they were covert or overt, did they combat
foreign tactics, and the financial expenditure of the operation. The
tactics were covert in nature as multiple US agencies were coordinating
an influence campaign consisting of millions of letters writing to voters,
short-wave radio broadcasts, and book and article publishing. All to
influence the Italian electorate and convince them that the shortfalls of the
Communist Party were directly connected to what will happen to Italy if
the leftist candidate were to win.69
These covert tactics outlined above were used in opposition to direct
adversarial covert tactics. The Soviet Union was running a direct
opposition funding the Popular Democratic Front (FDP), the leftist
coalition of parties supporting candidate Palmiro Togliatti. The extent
of the Soviet campaign to support the FDP is not well known nor
documented. What is known is the statement provided by F. Mark Wyatt
who stated there were bags of money coming straight out of the Soviet
compound in Rome going to politicians and parties they supported.
There is speculation that the amount of money coming out of the Soviet
compound equated to $8-$10 million a month. The US campaign outspent
https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.11.2.672
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and outran the Soviet campaign leading to a victory of De Gasperi and
the Christian Democracy; with this information this analysis will speculate
that the campaign of the United States was surpassing $8-$10 million in
direct campaign funds- and that is not including the large-scale influence
campaign ran in coordination by multiple US agencies.70
The stated justification that the United States used in intervening in
the 1948 Italian election was identified with F. Mark Wyatt’s statements
about fear of Soviet influence in Italy and the undermining of the United
States’ position in Europe and the Mediterranean.71 The intervention
itself was partisan motivated, meaning it was motivated by the
support of a candidate, political party, or faction. The intervention was
globally-motivated based on statements made that the justification for
intervention was that our position could be lost or undermined in the
region if the opposing party would win and bring Italy into the Soviet
sphere of influence.
After analyzing the methodology of the theory and applying it to the
research that has been previously conducted, it can be determined that
the United States had a high vested interest in the 1948 Italian election.
This is based on the use of expensive and incredibly in-depth covert
tactics that combatted foreign espionage tactics, the stated justification
of keeping Italy out of the Soviet sphere of influence. The nature of the
intervention was globally-motivated, affecting not only the United States
but also the stability of the Mediterranean and possibly all of Europe.
1964 Chilean Election
The 1964 Chilean electoral intervention maintains some of the same
fears of Soviet influence as did the Italian election. History of US
influence started as early as 1890 when President Madison investigated
revolutionary groups in South America. The United States found the views
of the front-running candidate of the election, Salvador Allende, against
US interests. Allende stated he wanted to “bring about an irreversible
Marxist revolution in Chile.” This led to the United States to plan and
conduct their intervention.72
The tactics and methodologies used by the United States started with
an initial $3 million for plan execution. An initial $20 million was also
funneled to Chile through President John F. Kennedy’s Alliance for
Progress partnership that was used to create better diplomatic relations
with Latin American countries, though some of this money was used in the
electoral intervention.73 The tactics were primarily covert in nature as the
CIA used large-scale propaganda campaigns to skew public opinion on
the leftist candidate. The CIA did use overt tactics that were reminiscent
of conventional political operations: Get-out-the-vote operations, voter
registration drives, canvassing, etc.
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The primary source of influence, black propaganda, was used to create
divides between the Communist party and the local union and community
leaders. Propaganda falsified to look like another party distributed it
rather than the true manufacturer is black propaganda. These tactics were
used against the Chilean Communist Party and that will be considered
combatant operations even though funds from Russia are only speculated.
The Church Committee report touches on the stated justification stating
that the broad goal of the intervention was to minimize, or ideally
prevent, any influence from Chilean Communists or Marxists in the
elected government emerging out of the 1964 election. The intervention
was partisan motivated since the United States was specifically seeking
to oppress a combatant or opposing political party from emerging in
Chilean politics.74 The intervention was globally-motivated because of the
stated justification that no intervention from the United States will result
in influence of Chilean Communists and Marxists in the newly-elected
government; thus, leading to destabilization in the region and Communist
influence that could spread to other South American countries.
After the application of the vested interest theory, it shows that the United
States had a high vested interest in the Chilean election, like in the Italian
election. We have identified that the United States used both covert and
overt tactics to influence the electorate; the stated justification of keeping
Chilean Communist and Marxist influence out of the newly-elected
government; the nature of the justification being a partisan intervention;
and the nature of the intervention itself was globally-motivated because
of the United States’ desire to prevent and minimize Communist influence
in Chile.75 The United States believed that Communist influence would
become Soviet-backed instability in the region.
1970 Chilean Election
The analysis of the 1970 will encompass much of the same research
and analysis completed in the 1964 election but will maintain a separate
analysis. The tactics used in the 1970 election were negligible compared
to the previous year’s election. The United States utilized unspecific adcampaigns that were not targeting a particular demographic but instead
were directed at preventing Salvador Allende’s victory.76
The stated motivation was the same as the previous election and
maintained partisan and globally motivated intervention. The difference
is that there was great disdain shown with upper-level and executive
management in the Central Intelligence Agency because of the lack of
direction the program maintained. Statements made by the Station Chief
of Chile openly criticized the management and blamed them for the
failures of the program.77
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From the lack of direction and focus in the program, the United States can
be seen as having a low vested interest in the election. Better direction
may have resulted in better outcomes in the program, but the results were
simply not there. The intervention led to Salvador Allende winning the
election and the installment of the military coup d’état in 1973.78
2002 Bolivian Election
Bolivia had a long history of instability before the 2002 election, like other
South American countries, they relied on US aid for many government
programs. The Bolivian government was trying to eradicate cocoa farms
as part of a program to enforce the United States’ War on Drugs ran
by the Bush Administration. The cocoa farmers, known as cocaleros,
were forced to mobilize and create unions, of which became a political
movement in Bolivia. The leader of the movement, Evo Morales, was seen
as a substantial threat to US interests in Bolivia.79
The tactics used to intervene in the 2002 Bolivian election were solely
overt in nature, did not fight against an opposing campaign, nor did
they have any substantial financial expenditure. The main tactic of
intervention was a statement made by US Ambassador to Bolivia, Manuel
Rocha, warning the Bolivian electorate to not vote for Evo Morales, the
Socialist candidate.80
The stated justification was that Bolivia would lose aid if Evo Morales
were to be elected and is partisan motivated intervention because of
the lack of support for a certain political faction. This intervention would
be considered self-motivated intervention since the reason Ambassador
Rocha made a statement to not support Morales was directly because of
the War on Drugs and the problems with Bolivian cocaine interdiction in
the United States.
After this more unconventional analysis of this intervention compared
to the more conventional electoral interventions previously examined,
differences can be seen in practically all aspects of execution and
these differences can shed some light on the effectiveness of different
intervention tactics. The United States had a low vested interest in this
election given by the lackluster tactics used that backfired in Evo Morales’
favor. If the United States wanted to implement a better strategy to
influence Bolivian policy, they would have had a more comprehensive plan
of attack with covert operations and allocated funds.81
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Figure 3. Visual summary of the results.

Notes: The variables are displayed with the summary of the results per each
election.

CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
This article began with the articulation of a novel theory that would
be used to identify the vested interest of the United States in foreign
electoral interventions. It identified this vested interest by identifying
three main questions:
•

What are the tactics and methodologies used by the United
States when they intervene in a foreign election?

•

What is the stated motivation for the United States to
intervene in a foreign election?

•

What is the magnitude of the electoral intervention?

To prove the academic viability of this new expanded theory, it was
applied to four elections that the United States intervened in, analyzed
them by the defined factors, and then rated the intervention on the metric
of high vested interest or low vested interest.
The article first examined the 1948 Italian election, analyzing all the
potential Soviet Union influences that could have destabilized the
Mediterranean and Europe as a whole. It then examined the 1964 and
1970 Chilean elections where Communist and Marxists parties were
trying to influence the newly-elected government. Lastly, it examined the
statements made by Ambassador Rocha in the 2002 Bolivian election,
its effect on the Bolivian electorate, and how the decision of the White
House to pressure the Bolivian electorate to vote a certain way with a
threat effectively backfired and led to overwhelming support for the
Socialist candidate.
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PROFESSIONAL SIGNIFICANCE
Being able to identify the vested interest of a predator-country within
a prey-country has wide-reaching benefits, specifically with the United
States and other global powers.82 Though this article methodology is
purely qualitative in nature, its conversion to a quantitative “vestedinterest test” could produce datasets that demonstrate our historical
regional interests. Using this data and combining it with a regressionmodel analysis that predicts future conflict for example DARPA’s
Integrated Crisis Early Warning System, can help form a historical analysis
of the governmental priorities of the United States, contributing one
variable to the larger equation used to determine if we should be involved
in a prey-country’s election henceforth.
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